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The aim of this paper is to analyze certain aspects of foreign direct investment (FDI) and of 
the development of regional integration agreements (RIA). Firstly, we include variables 
that are additional to those generally considered in the gravity models of FDI determinants 
(variables related to the external sector and to the relative size of economies that are 
involved in each bilateral relationship). Secondly, the analysis of “winners” and “losers” is 
disaggregated at country level, so as to consider the possible effects of agreements on 
each MERCOSUR country in the framework of the FTAA and the MERCOSUR-EU 
agreement. The form that FDI among countries takes allows us to profile winners and 
losers as regards FDI flows in the framework of regional integration agreements. FDI 
increase could be associated with the external creation of FDI, and we find bilateral FDI 
flows are more elastic as regards foreign trade. If the FTAA and MERCOSUR-EU 
agreements increased trade flows –which is a distinct possibility- those flows would have a 
positive impact on FDI flows, and predominant forms of expansion would be the 
open/resource seeking form. In this framework, Brazil would be the only “winner” inside the 
bloc and Argentina would probably be the “loser”. In small economies, Uruguay would tend 
to be a “winner” as regards potential to capture FDI, and Paraguay a “loser”. 
 
JEL: F15, F2, F23 
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment, Economic Integration, Multinational Enterprises. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyze some additional aspects of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and the development of regional integration agreements (RIA)
2.  
 
Firstly, we include some variables that are additional to those traditionally considered in 
the gravity model of FDI determinants. These variables are related to the external sector 
and to the relative size of the economies involved in each bilateral relationship. They 
enable us to draw some conclusions about the forms of FDI expansion in the MERCOSUR 
countries, and to analyze the strategies transnational corporations (TNCs) would be most 
likely to adopt in the framework of new integration agreements, particularly if some of 
these enterprises opt for complex integration strategies. In recent years, these new forms 
of expansion have become more important in the world economy, and they go beyond the 
“horizontal” and “vertical” strategies that TNCs have traditionally employed in the 
MERCOSUR countries.  
 
Secondly, as estimations with the general model only capture the average impact of 
integration agreements, the analysis of “winners” and “losers” is disaggregated at country 
level so the possible effects of agreements on each MERCOSUR country in the framework 
of the FTAA and the MERCOSUR-EU agreements can be considered.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: first, we present an analysis of the evolution of bilateral 
FDI flows and the relationship between external openness and investment. Second, we 
discuss different theoretical and methodological aspects of gravity models that affect the 
objectives of this research, and we also tackle theoretical questions about the strategies of 
transnational corporations (TNCs) and the analysis of winners and losers. Third, we 
present the econometric model. Fourth, we give the empirical results as regards FDI 
expansion forms and winners and losers in integration processes, with particular emphasis 
on possible winners and losers among the MERCOSUR countries in an agreement with 




1.1 Bilateral FDI flows 
 
World bilateral flows of FDI increased between 1983 and 2003. Flows from the European 
Union (EU) were clearly predominant and determined the global trend. EU flows also led to 
the considerable fluctuations in the global trend in world FDI that took place in 1998-2002. 
Between 1997 and 2000 world bilateral FDI increased threefold, FDI outflows from Europe 
to countries not belonging to the EU decreased, while bilateral flows among the countries 
of the European Union increased fivefold. At the end of the period under analysis (2003) 
FDI was around the 1997 level (figure 1).   
                                                 
2 This research was carried out in the framework of the project “The External Agenda of the MERCOSUR: The 
Impact of Three Simultaneous Negotiations”, financed by The Tinker Foundation, and it complements a 
working paper by López and Orlicki (2005): “Regional Integration and Foreign Direct Investment: the Potential 
Impact of the FTAA and the EU-MERCOSUR Agreement on FDI flows into MERCOSUR Countries”.   2
Figure 1 
Bilateral FDI, 1983-2003 
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Source: Own elaboration based on OECD (2004). 
 
 
The increase in bilateral FDI flows at the end of the 1990s was closely connected to the 
wave of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) that have been taking place mainly 
among enterprises in developed countries. This mostly involved European transnational 
corporations (TNCs), which accounted for nearly 70% of the purchases between 1998 and 
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Source: Own elaboration based on UNCTAD (2003 and 2004). 
 
   3
These cross-border mergers and acquisitions were concentrated in the EU and the 
NAFTA, the biggest sellers. The fact that the EU was the principal buyer and seller 
confirms the notion that the increase in bilateral FDI flows among European countries was 
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Source: Own elaboration based on UNCTAD (2003 and 2004). 
 
 
The trend in bilateral FDI flows to the MERCOSUR countries is similar to that of global 
flows. During the 1980s inflows to the region were very low, although they tended to grow 
slightly. Since the beginning of the 1990s these inflows increased sharply. At the end of 
that decade the inflow of FDI to the MERCOSUR countries doubled, which was in line with 
the evolution of FDI in the world as a whole.  
 
The principal source of this FDI was the EU countries, and their investments were mostly 
connected to the privatization of public enterprises at the beginning of the decade and to 
the wave of cross-border mergers and acquisitions that took place in the world in the late 
1990s. Even though the information on mergers and acquisitions does not exactly fit the 
FDI data registered in balance of payments statistics, it is clear that a considerable 
percentage of the investment in the MERCOSUR countries in the 1990s was due to M&A 
(figure 4). Although the evolution of bilateral investment flows among MERCOSUR 
countries and the principal investors in the region coincides in time with the expansion of 
the market, these flows followed the trend in the world economy, and were not necessarily 
determined by the integration agreement.    4
Figure 4 
FDI Inflows by Source and Cross-border Mergers & Acquisitions 
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The importance of this trend makes it necessary to distinguish a more “normal” period of 
FDI inflows to the region (1984-1997). This will enable us to evaluate our conclusions 
when we incorporate into the model a phenomenon that is unlikely to recur to the same 
extent in the near future.  
 
 
1.2 FDI and trade openness 
 
The external openness of economies, measured as the sum of trade flows (exports and 
imports) as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP), is an important variable in the 
analysis of winners and losers as regards FDI in the framework of an integration process. 
According to various theoretical approaches, the most open economies are those that 
have the best chances of capturing FDI. Traditional forms of TNC expansion (horizontal or 
market seeking) could be yielding space to vertical or complex forms which involve more 
intensive external trade. It might be possible to associate a high level of external openness 
with more open transnational expansion forms which could attract FDI, particularly FDI 
from developed to developing countries. This is the basis of the hypothesis we advance in 
the next section of this study. 
 
This relationship between FDI and external openness would appear to be confirmed by the 
situation in some countries. In the members of the Agreement of South Eastern Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and also China, Hong Kong and Korea, there is a correlation between 
degree of openness and the share of FDI in GDP. This can be seen in figure 5. 
 
In the regional integration agreements (RIAs) involving Latin America countries, this 
relationship only appears in the Central America Common Market (CACM) and in Mexico, 
and it does not hold in the MERCOSUR or the Andean Community (CAN) (figure 6).   5
Figure 5 
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2. THEORETICAL QUESTIONS 
 
In this section of the paper we will discuss some aspects of FDI determinants, and the 
channels through which regional integration can affect FDI. First we present some 
elements that contribute to enriching the theoretical base of gravity models and to the 
selection of variables incorporated into the descriptive model. We focus in particular on 
elements that allow us to consider different strategies that TNC could adopt in the 
framework of the new integration agreements that the MERCOSUR countries are 
exploring. Secondly, after presenting the mechanism through which integration 
agreements could impact on FDI flows, we analyze some different approaches to the 
matter of winners and losers. The way in which “current” winners (losers) can become 
losers (winners) in the context of an integration agreement with developed countries 
depends on a country’s ability to generate a transition towards strategies that are currently 
coming to the fore in global TNC behavior.  
 
 
2.1 Theoretical aspects of gravity models and forms of transnational expansion  
 
Gravity models include a set of descriptive variables such as the GDP of the host and the 
source country, the distance between the two countries, the GDP of the integration 
agreement to which both countries belong, and other variables that define particular 
characteristics of the countries (for example, degree of trade openness, privatizations, 
political risk). The combination of different theoretical aspects used in some analytical 
frameworks, particularly Markusen’s “knowledge-capital” model and a set of typology of 
TNC strategies (for example Dunning, 1993; Trajtenberg and Vigorito, 1982; and 
UNCTAD, 1993), can contribute to defining the set of variables to be included in the 
descriptive model and to identifying predominant forms of transnational expansion. This 
will enrich the theoretical base of gravity models.  
 
Markusen and Maskus (2001) say there are two basic models to include transnational 
firms in the traditional theoretical approaches to international trade: the “horizontal” and the 
“vertical” model. In the horizontal model, the firm produces similar types of goods and 
services in different countries, and its main strategy is “market-seeking” rather than taking 
advantage of differences in factor prices. The key assumption in this form of expansion is 
the presence of economies of scale at the firm level, which is one advantage that TNCs 
have over domestic firms. This advantage interplays with trade costs to determine whether 
the firm will supply the foreign market through exports or FDI. If trade costs are high, the 
TNC will become increasingly involved in FDI. 
 
In the vertical model, the firm separates different steps in its value chain in order to take 
advantage of factor price differentials across countries (the “resource-seeking” strategy). 
Dunning (1993) identifies three types of TNC resource seeking. First, TNCs that are 
seeking natural resources and that engage in FDI to reduce costs and to secure supply 
sources, second, those seeking supplies of cheap unskilled or semi-skilled labor, and third, 
those that want to acquire technological capability, management or marketing expertise, or 
organizational skills. 
 
The first model is characteristic of most FDI flows among developed countries, where 
TNCs obtain advantages over domestic firms thanks to economies of scale at the firm 
level. The second model would typify north-south FDI flows. However north-south and 
south-south flows may also be horizontal if there are high trade barriers against imports.    7
 
While the “horizontal model” supposes that firms produce a homogeneous good, the usual 
situation is that TNC affiliates produce different varieties of a final good and these are 
consumed in the local market and also exported. This would be a particular form of FDI 
which Levy et al. (2003) call “horizontal FDI in differentiated goods”, and it is similar to 
what Dunning (1993) defines as “efficiency seeking” FDI. The motivation behind this kind 
of FDI is to rationalize the structure of established horizontal or vertical investments in 
such a way that the TNC can obtain higher profits from the common governance of 
geographically dispersed activities. These benefits have to do with economies of scale and 
scope, and with risk diversification. 
 
Markusen and Maskus (2001) locate the horizontal and vertical models in a new 
theoretical framework (the “knowledge-capital” model) which allows analysis of the 
determinants of three strategies or forms of expansion, domestic, horizontal and vertical, 
and generates predictions about the relationship between TNC affiliates and trade. They 
maintain that affiliate’s production and trade in some specific good could be substitutes for 
each other in the “horizontal” model while they could be complementary in the “vertical” 
model. These authors, using the “knowledge-capital” model, suggest that an affiliate’s 
production and trade tend to be substitutes between similar countries, and to be 
complementary when countries are very different as regards their relative factor 
endowment. 
  
Starting from a division between “open” and “closed” forms of transnational expansion, 
which is usual in the literature about TNC, especially in interpretations that attempt to link 
TNC strategies to their foreign trade, Bittencourt (2003) associates these forms with the 
categories defined in the analytic framework proposed by Dunning (1993), differentiating 
different kinds of FDI: market seeking, resource seeking, efficiency seeking and assets 
seeking. 
 
This author does a classification crossing “basic” expansion forms (closed or oriented to 
the internal market, and open or oriented to foreign markets) and entry forms of FDI. Basic 
expansion forms include semi-open forms, which can mean a market-seeking logic in 
regional markets and also the development of international trade, which give them some 
particularities. The key aspect in the differentiation between open and closed forms is the 




Therefore it is important to consider transnational expansion forms and FDI determinants 
at the same time. In the baseline model we include two additional variables: Simisize, an 
indicator of similar countries’ size which could enable us to capture horizontal transnational 
expansion forms; and XMH, which represents the external openness of the host economy. 
In other model specifications we include variables that represent export projection so as to 
capture some elements that allow us to identify predominant expansion forms in bilateral 
relationships between countries’ blocs. 
 
Most of the empirical studies about FDI and regional integration only explore two motives 
for firms to expand abroad (horizontal and vertical FDI). But apart from these two TNC 
strategies it is important to consider two other new trends in FDI (just as UNCTAD does in 
its World Investment Reports 2004), the role that cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
                                                 
3 See the description of these categories in Bittencourt (2003).    8
(M&A) have played in the increase in FDI, and the “complex integration strategies” 
increasingly employed by TNCs that are both horizontally and vertically integrated. Yeaple 
(2003) has defined this type of TNC as one which establishes affiliates in some foreign 
countries to avoid transport costs, and in others to take advantage of factor price 
differentials. This strategy creates complementarities between the two types of affiliates. 
 
TNCs employ complex integration strategies when “north-north and north-south FDI 
reduce the cost of serving international markets in complementary ways, creating 
complementarities between the two forms of FDI. Firms that undertake vertical (horizontal) 
foreign investments lower their unit costs and thereby expand their sales. Having 
expanded the number of units sold, these firms stand to gain proportionately more by 
further reducing their unit cost by undertaking horizontal (vertical) foreign investment” 
(Yeaple, 2003). 
  
This strategy creates dependence between the level of FDI in one country and the 
characteristics and policies of its neighbors. Two locations may be either complements or 
substitutes, and this relation will depend on the characteristics of the industry in question 
such as the level of transport cost, the factor intensity of production, and the cost of 
investing abroad. When transport costs fall, as occurs in regional integration agreements, 
locations that were once substitutes may become complements.  
 
In other words, when some industries have specific characteristics that allow complex 
integration strategies, and when transport costs fall due to a regional integration 
agreement, it is possible that horizontal affiliates may be transformed into vertical affiliates 
in the framework of an international complex integration strategy employed by the firm. 
This could be an important factor in explaining FDI in Mexico or in some Central America 
countries, and also in understanding FDI from developed countries to China and other 
Asian countries, and intra-Asian FDI. It should also be considered when analyzing in 
perspective the FDI in MERCOSUR in the framework of regional integration agreements 
with developed countries. 
 
The incorporation of these concepts into econometric models is complex. The variables 
used in the modelization to consider the effects of “FDI creation”, “FDI diversion”, and “FDI 
dilution” are closely associated with horizontal and vertical FDI, but they are not associated 
with possible transitions between the two forms of FDI. So as to include some dimension 
of this strategy, we discriminate in the general model between countries’ blocs.  
 
In the literature we have not found theoretical studies that include M&A in general 
equilibrium models. It is not clear whether or not M&A are connected to the most 
conventional determinants of FDI: the size and dynamics of the host market (horizontal 
FDI), or the factorial endowment or trade openness of the host economy (vertical FDI). Our 
hypothesis is that M&A are related to disturbances in global oligopolies linked to regulatory 




2.3 Winners and Losers 
 
Regional integration agreements (RIA) could have different impacts on FDI flows. The 
impact would depend, among other things, on the characteristics of the countries that 
belong to the bloc, the specific nature of the integration agreement, the type of FDI that   9
there is in these countries (horizontal-vertical, export oriented or import substituting), the 
economic policies implemented in each country before and after the agreement. 
 
Also, the impact of a RIA on intra-regional and extra-regional FDI flows could be different. 
In the former, as an RIA means a lowering of intra-regional trade barriers when the 
agreement is signed, firms that before the agreement supplied a market through FDI could 
begin to supply it by exports from the source country. In this case, intra-regional FDI flows 
would probably decrease if they respond to horizontal forms of FDI (De Souza & Lochard, 
2004). On the other hand, RIAs can stimulate vertical FDI among member countries when 
firms distribute their production geographically in search of lower total costs (Blomström 
and Kokko, 1997), thus increasing trade flows. In this case FDI and trade flows are 
complementary.  
 
As RIAs facilitate trade among member countries, horizontal FDI in differentiated goods 
could increase since it would be easer for TNCs to specialize each affiliate in the region 
and to exchange different goods among their affiliates through intra-firm trade. 
 
When it comes to extra-regional FDI flows, RIAs could also have different impacts. When 
FDI is market-seeking (horizontal FDI) the increase in market size that comes about 
through the RIA generates greater investment opportunities for extra-regional TNCs 
depending on regional trade barriers with the rest of the world. When vertical FDI does not 
lead to production fragmentation among member countries, it is possible that the RIA will 
not have any impact on extra-regional FDI flows, or will make a negative impact if trade 
barriers with the rest of the world are raised as a consequence of the formation of the bloc. 
If vertical FDI involves production fragmentation among member countries, or if FDI is 
horizontal in differentiated goods, FDI from outsiders will probably increase since the RIA 
leads to a reduction in the costs of un-integrated production in different locations within the 
region. 
 
Markusen (2003) has applied his theoretical framework to analyzing the effects of RIAs on 
extra-regional FDI flows. When developing countries form an RIA, the increase in market 
size could open up investment opportunities for third country TNCs with horizontal 
strategies. Also FDI flows could increase when the RIA is made up of developed and 
developing countries if TNCs try to exploit localization advantage in developing members 
to export to the developed countries that are members of the RIA (“exportation platform” 
FDI). This strategy could also be used by TNCs in developed members, thus increasing 
intra-regional FDI flows and generating a competitive effect in third country TNCs that 
could reduce their potential benefits (Markusen, 2003). 
 
Finally, the RIA can lead to more extra-regional investment for the region as a whole, but 
this does not mean more FDI in every member of the RIA. FDI may be unequally 
distributed across the countries that are in the regional agreement. As De Sousa & 
Lochard (2004) said “additional FDI flows generated by new memberships do not 
necessarily locate in the new members”. In an RIA there may be winners and losers, in 
terms of the amount of FDI received by each country.  
 
There may be also a redistribute effect on FDI within the region (FDI dilution). This occurs 
when horizontal TNCs concentrate their production in a single country and supply other 
countries through trade when barriers to trade inside the region have been removed, or 
when FDI is relocated in new members that have lower production costs.  
   10
What determines whether a particular country wins or loses? In most of the literature on 
RIA and FDI the conclusion is that one of the factors that may explain who loses and who 
wins is country size. Firms may not want to invest in a small country when there is 
uncertainty about the future of the RIA. Levy, Stein and Daude (2003) considered that the 
biggest losers could be medium-size countries, since small countries are more likely to be 
supplied by trade than by FDI, irrespective of whether they belong to the RIA. However, in 
a previous study of determinants of FDI flows to the MERCOSUR (Bittencourt and 
Domingo, 2002), we found that the RIA might have played a negative role as regards FDI 
flows to smaller member countries (especially Uruguay). 
 
On the other hand, countries that offer a more attractive package for foreign investors 
because they have better-quality institutions, a better labor force, more attractive tax 
treatment for TNCs and better-developed infrastructure could be winners. 
 
Te Velde and Bezemer (2004) explored different reasons why the formation of an RIA 
does not necessarily lead to an equal distribution of FDI across countries. They found that 
the larger a country is relative to others in the region, the more FDI it will attract, and that 
poorer countries in a region do not necessarily attract less FDI. They also confirmed the 
hypothesis that regionalization meant that core countries would attract more FDI than 
peripheral countries. 
 
Te Velde and Fahnbulleh (2003) considered other factors that have a bearing on the 
extent to which uneven distribution takes place: the level of external most-favored-nation 
tariffs, the strictness of rules of origin, and agglomeration effects in individual member 
countries. They suggested that if integration leads to more FDI with equal benefits for the 
members of the RIA it could start a virtuous circle, and cooperation on joint investment 
promotion could bring benefits across the whole region.  
 
The analysis of winners and losers involved increases or decreases in FDI inflows, but 
other factors to do with the welfare effects of FDI in host countries have been debated. 
The discussion of the potential benefits and costs of FDI suggests that not all FDI results 
in similar benefits. To derive more benefit from FDI a country has to have foreign affiliates 
located in more advanced industries where potential technological spillovers are greater. 
This will induce these firms to export part of their production, which will in turn tend to 
reduce restrictions on the balance of payments, and this will also induce domestic firms to 
follow suit and help to strengthen forward and backward links between TNCs and domestic 
firms which have the capacity to absorb those spillovers
4. 
 
Here we are faced with two types of questions. First, what kind of policies can countries 
adopt to ensure beneficial results from FDI inflows, and how may an RIA affect the 
desirability and effectiveness of those policies? This question, which is the most important 
aspect of the contribution of FDI to development, is not within the scope of our study. The 
second question is: what can countries do to become FDI winners or to improve their 
                                                 
4 For a discussion of FDI spillovers see Blömstrom and Kokko (1996), who identify two types of spillovers: 
“productivity spillovers” and “market access spillovers”. The former occur when local firms improve their 
productivity as a result of links to TNC affiliates that are technologically more advanced, and when foreign firms 
train workers who are then engaged by domestic firms. The latter occur when TNC export operations pave the 
way for local firms to enter the same export markets. FDI may also generate negative spillovers, when 
domestic firms may be displaced from the market, and may find that the cost of production factors increase as 
a result of foreign investment. An analysis of the first type of spillover in MERCOSUR countries can be found in 
Laplane, M. (ed.) (2005).   11
capacity to attract FDI, in the context of regional integration? In this paper we formulate 
some hypotheses about how an RIA can affect FDI determinants. 
 
The evidence discussed in Levy, Stein and Daude (2003) suggests that an improvement in 
attraction capacity may be less in countries that have factor endowments that are similar to 
those of the source countries, and in countries that are relatively closed to international 
trade. These authors consider that openness amplifies the impact of the RIA on FDI, and 
also changes the composition of FDI from horizontal to vertical, a shift that could increase 
the benefits a country derives from TNC activities. 
 
Levy, Stein and Daude (2002b) demonstrate that countries that present a more attractive 
overall package to foreign investors are also likely to gain more FDI from the formation of 
an RIA. The question is how a country’s attractiveness can be improved.  
 
The above-mentioned studies do not specify which countries in different integration 
agreements would be winners or losers. They only suggest a set of general characteristics 
that would cause a country to be a winner or a loser. This analysis involves a static 
approach to the FDI-integration process relationship. The integration process can exert an 
influence on the set of characteristics of its members and cause them to change from 
being a loser (winner) to a winner (loser). 
   12
3. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS  
 
3.1 Basic Gravity Model 
 
The basic gravity model to explain FDI flows is as follows
5: 
 
FDIij,t =βj GDP Hostj,t +βi GDP Sourcei,t +γ RIAij,t +η EXPMARS i,t +φ PRRHj,t  
+λ Privj,t+ +δ Inflationj,t +ν Simisizeij,t +σ BITij,t +ρ XMHj,t + ϕt + αij + ujt 
 
Where: 
FDIij,t stands for bilateral FDI flows (from country i to country j) at time t
6. As is standard 
practice in the gravity model, we will take the logs, rather than the level, of FDI flows as the 
dependent variable
7.  
GDP Hostj,t is the logarithm of the real GDP of the host country.  
GDP Sourcei,t is the logarithm of the real GDP of the source country.  
EXPMARSi,t is the GDP Extended RIA Source variable used by Levy et al. (2003). This 
variable is measured as the log of the joint GDP of the source country plus all the 
countries that are RIA partners of the source country. If the coefficient is negative, this 
variable captures FDI diversion/dilution.  
RIAij,t is a set of different country dummy variables as follows. 
In a first specification, we construct a dummy that takes the value one at time t if the host 
country is a member of one of the following regional integration agreements: MERCOSUR, 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Andean Community (CAN), Central 
American Common Market (CACM), Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Australia-New 
Zealand Free Trade Area, Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), European 
Union, European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
8, and zero otherwise.  
                                                 
5 The model is the same as that used by López and Orlicke (2005) with two additional variables (Simisize and 
XMH). 
6 According to UNCTAD, in the case of TNC associates and subsidiaries, FDI flows include the net sales of 
shares and loans (including non-cash acquisitions made against equipment, manufacturing rights, etc.)  to the 
parent company, plus the parent firm’s share of the affiliate’s reinvested earnings, plus total net intra-company 
loans (short- and long-term) provided by the parent company. For TNC branches, FDI flows consist of the 
increase in reinvested earnings plus the net increase in funds received from the foreign direct investor. FDI 
flows with a negative sign (reverse flows) indicate that at least one of the components in the above definition is 
negative and not offset by positive amounts in the remaining components. 
7 Levy et al. (2002a) give several reasons for doing this. Firstly, the log specification provides a useful 
normalization that reduces the weight of pairs with very large FDI flows. Secondly, it allows interpretation of the 
coefficients of the continuous variables as elasticities. Lastly, it has typically provided the best fit in gravity 
equations. 
8 As to the date to be considered as marking the beginning of integration processes, we will follow Montenegro 
and Soloaga (2004) and Levy et al. (2003), who use the year of their creation (or re-launching, when an 
existing RIA is re-formed in the expectation of a significant change in trade and investment patterns). The 
years considered for each agreement are as follows: MERCOSUR (1991), NAFTA (1994), CAN (1991), CACM   13
Next, we divide the RIA variable into intra- and extra-regional FDI, which gives us two 
dummy variables. The Intra-RIAij,t variable takes the value of 1 if the host and the source 
country are part of the same agreement at time t, and zero otherwise. The Extra-RIAij,t 
takes the value of 1 if the host country is a member of one of the RIAs and the source 
country is not a member of it at time t, and zero otherwise. If the coefficient of Intra-RIA 
(Extra-RIA) is positive, it therefore captures intra-regional (extra-regional) “investment 
creation”. 
In the third specification, we divide the host countries belonging to an RIA into three 
groups depending on which RIA they belong to: 
1) RIA1: CACM, CAN, CARICOM, MERCOSUR and NAFTA (in this case, the host 
countries are candidates to enter the FTAA)  
2)  European Union (EU) 
3)  Others: ASEAN, EFTA, Gulf Cooperation Council, Australia-New Zealand Free Trade 
Area and CEFTA
9. 
Next, the Intra-RIA and Extra-RIA dummy variables used in the second specification were 
interacted with three dummy variables associated with the above-mentioned groups of 
RIAs. Thus we will have the following dummy variables: Intra-RIA1ij,t, Intra-EUij,t and Intra-
otherij,t, Extra-RIA1ij,t, Extra-EUij,t and Extra-otherij,t
10. The group of host countries with no 
RIAs will be our benchmark.  
PRRHj,t is a variable that aims to capture the political and institutional environment in host 
countries, on the assumption that a good environment has a positive influence on FDI 
attraction. It is based on the Political Risk Index drawn up by the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG). The Index ranges from 0 to 100 points and is built with 12 weighted 
variables: Government Stability, Socioeconomic Conditions, Investment Profile, Internal 
Conflict, External Conflict, Corruption, Military in Politics, Religion in Politics, Law and 
Order, Ethnic Tensions, Democratic Accountability and Bureaucracy Quality. The higher 
the Index, the lower the host country risk. 
Privj,t is the amount involved in privatizations in the host country at period t. Privatizations 
could be associated with significant FDI inflows and with structural reforms in host 
countries that could also favor FDI. 
Inflationj,t  is the annual inflation rate in the host country at period t, to control for 
macroeconomic instability. We should expect a negative relation between inflation rates 
and FDI flows. 
Simisizeij,t is an index of size similarity between countries. It takes values from -∞ (the log 
of the number near zero) in cases of perfect dissimilarity, and -0.69 [ln (0.5)] when 
                                                                                                                                                     
(1991), CARICOM (1973), ASEAN (1992), Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (1983), Gulf Cooperation 
Council (1982), CEFTA, EFTA and EU (various years depending on the country involved). For Canada and the 
United States, we have also considered the CUFTA (1989). Naturally, we have taken into account the effective 
date of entrance of each country into the RIA in question.  
9 Since our focus is on the impact of the FTAA and EU-MERCOSUR agreements, the inclusion of other 
regional integration agreements in our analysis is mainly to control for their effects on FDI as regards FTAA 
and EU countries. 
10 In RIA1 we differentiate the NAFTA effect from the South-South RIAs (Intra-RIA1N and Intra-RIA1S)   14
countries are the same size. We should expect that countries of similar size have higher 







































XMHj,t is the logarithm of the sum of the host country’s exports and imports. It is a proxy of 
the openness of the host economy. We should expect a positive relation between this 
variable and FDI inflows. A positive relationship between FDI and external openness could 
mean that the predominant transnational strategy would be the vertical form. 
BITij,t  Bilateral Investment Treaties: this is a variable that takes a value of one if both 
countries (host and source) have a bilateral investment treaty signed and in force at time t, 
and zero otherwise
11. This variable captures the average impact of these treaties on the 
FDI flows. We should expect a positive relation to FDI inflows
12.  
ϕt are year dummy variables for the 1984-2002 period. These variables pick up the effects 
of any factors affecting bilateral investments that vary over time, are constant across pairs, 
and have not been included in the list of explanatory variables. In our case, they help to 
control for a spectacular increase in FDI over time
13. 
αij are the country pair fixed effects. Our specification relies on panel data and includes 
country pair fixed effects in order to isolate the time series dimension of the integration 
process on FDI, and leave out the cross-sectional variation. Hence, these country pair 
fixed effects will subsume time-invariant pair-specific variables such as distance, borders, 
common language, or colonial links
14. To some extent, these effects could also pick up 





3.2 Model Specification for the Analysis of FDI Expansion Forms 
 
Two additional specifications of the baseline model were used to identify probable links or 
associations between FDI flows in host countries and their commercial or export 
tendencies and patterns. This could enrich the identification and analysis of the 
predominant forms that FDI took in host countries during the period of study.  
                                                 
11 This variable only captures investment treaties independently of regional integration agreements. Some 
RIAS contain investment provisions, but they are not considered in this variable. 
12 Dee and Gali (2003), in contrast, found a lack of response of FDI to bilateral investment treaties. 
13 In general, the estimations of these dummy variable coefficients are not reported. The tables below that 
report our econometric estimations show F test results for time dummies as a whole. 
14 According to de Sousa and Lochard (2004), this methodology has several advantages. First, it reduces the 
risk of co-linearity between explanatory variables. Second, it allows control of the correlation between some 
explanatory variables and the error term. It also prevents estimation biases in the specification of FDI invariant 
determinants (like the distance variable, a common border or a common language dummy) since these 
determinants are accounted for in the bilateral specific effect (Pakko and Wall, 2001). Finally, since it focuses 
on the time series dimension, it makes it possible to capture the dynamic relation between integration and FDI. 
Thus, it answers the “good” economic policy questions (Glick and Rose, 2002; Micco et al., 2003): Do 
countries that decide to form or join an integration process invest more in other member countries? Do 
countries that decide to form or join an integration process receive more FDI flows from non-partner countries?   15
 
First we substituted the openness variable (XMH) by external trade flows, specifically 
exports from host countries. This model specification was estimated for total bilateral 
flows, and then flows between developed countries and flows between developed and 
developing countries were separated for a new estimation. The objective is to test the 
hypothesis about the predominance of horizontal FDI in the relationship among developed 
countries, and vertical or another type of investment in FDI from developed to developing 
countries, and to analyze the principal differences that one form or another could have on 
the impacts of an integration process on FDI flows. 
 
The variables included in the model were the following; all refer to the host country (sub 
index j): 
 
XHj,t = total exports  
X-developedj,t = exports to developed countries  
X-developingj,t = exports to developing countries  
 
Secondly, host country exports were differentiated by type of good, so as to obtain new 
elements that allow us to reinforce the results obtained in the previous specification. 
Variable XH was replaced by the following variables, all of which refer to the host country 
(sub index j): 
 
X-foodj,t = food exports  
X-miningj,t = mining exports  
X-manuftotalj,t = total manufacturing exports, which are divided into: 
  X-textilj,t = textile exports  
  X-chemicalj,t = chemical exports  
  X-machequipj,t = machinery and equipment exports  
 
 
3.3 Model Specification for the Winners and Losers Analysis 
 
As was mentioned in 2.2, previous studies on this question do not identify which specific 
countries in regional integration agreements are winners or losers with respect to FDI. 
They only indicate general characteristics that could place a country in one or other 
category. In this paper, a first methodological approach to identifying and analyzing 
winners and losers in MERCOSUR in the framework of an amplified integration agreement 
was developed. This approach includes specific attraction variables in the model. This 
methodology allows us to capture the differentiated effect of internal and external FDI 
creation in each MERCOSUR country
15, although it is quite simple and not very 
sophisticated from an econometric point of view. 
 
The first group of attraction variables is made up of dummies that aim to capture each 
country’s specificities. They are the product of one dummy per country and FDI internal 
creation variables (IntraRIA1) and FDI external creation variables (ExtraRIA1) in the 
MERCOSUR integration agreement. As a result four variables for internal creation, one for 
each country (Dargintra, Dbraintra, Dparintra and Duruintra) were generated in the 
following way: IntraRIA1 * country dummy (1 for the country considered and 0 for others). 
                                                 
15 It was not possible in all cases to identify internal creation of FDI because of lack of information (we do not 
have information about intra MERCOSUR flows for Argentina and Uruguay).   16
Also, four variables for external creation, one for each country (Dargextra, Dbraextra, 
Dparextra and Duruextra) were constructed in the following way: ExtraRIA1 * country 
dummy (1 for the country considered and 0 for others). 
 
The second group of variables measures the relative size of each of the four countries, 
and it was constructed like the former group using the relative participation of each country 
in the RIA (evaluated by GDP) instead of a dummy per country
16.  Four variables were 
generated to measure internal creation (Argintra, Braintra, Parintra and Uruintra) with 
the following format: IntraRIA1* (GDP of the country considered / MERCOSUR GDP); and 
four to measure external creation (Argextra, Braextra, Parextra and Uruextra) with the 
following format: ExtraRIA1* (GDP of the country considered / MERCOSUR GDP). 
 
With the first group of variables we tried to determine whether there was internal and 
external FDI creation in each MERCOSUR country, and also the differences that these 
countries present as FDI receivers. With the second group we aimed to measure if 




The model was estimated in two ways. First we used fixed effects by bilateral relationship 
and second dummies per country excluding bilateral fixed effects, that is to say fixed 
effects per source and host country with other variables usually used in gravity models: 
 
Distance: kilometers between capitals of each country in the bilateral relationship 
Language: dummy that takes value 1 if the two countries have a common language and 0 
otherwise 
Contiguity:  dummy that takes value 1 if the two countries have a common border and 0 
otherwise  
 
The data is the same as those described in López and Orlicki. Trade data is based on 




                                                 
16 A similar approach can be found in Dee and Gali (2003), and Velde and Bezemer (2004). 
17 In the same way, for exploratory purposes, we constructed variables of FDI attraction for each country taking 
into account a set of country-specific characteristics. The results were similar to those obtained with the other 
two groups of variables, although of lesser magnitude. They are presented in annex 2.   17
4. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
 
4.1 FDI Expansion Forms 
 
In table 1, the results of López and Orlicki (2005) (column 1) and the results of the 




Table 1  












GDP Host  -0.62 -1.46 -1.47 -1.46 -1.79 
GDP Source  5.60 ***  5.41 ***  5.61 ***  5.41 ***  8.15 *** 
Simisize  ---  1.61 1.61 1.62 2.64 
Prrh  5.10 ***  5.11 ***  4.77 ***  5.16 ***  4.96 *** 
Inflation  -0.98 ***  -0.99 ***  -0.96 ***  -0.99 ***  -0.61 ** 
Priv  0.04 **  0.04 **  0.03 **  0.04 **  0.03 * 
BIT  1.30 **  1.26 **  1.15 **  1.28 **  1.32 * 
XMh  ---  0.28  0.34 (*)  0.28  0.53 ** 
IntraRIA1  2.94 **  2.91 **  ---  0.10 **  2.43 (*) 
IntraRIA1N  --- ---  -0.10  --- --- 
IntraRIA1S  --- ---  4.09  **  --- --- 
IntraEU  2.22 ***  1.74 (*)  1.75 (*)  0.06 (*)  1.49 
Intraothers  3.18 **  2.88 *  2.90 *  0.10 *  0.96 
ExtraRIA1  1.86 ***  1.78 ***  ---  0.06 ***  1.31 ** 
ExtraRIA1N  --- ---  0.87  --- --- 
ExtraRIA1S  ---  --- 2.39  *** ---  --- 
ExtraEU  3.73 ***  3.36 ***  3.35 ***  0.11 ***  3.84 *** 
Extraothers  1.12  *  0.71 0.74 0.02 1.09 
Expmars  -0.45 *  -0.43 *  -0.45 *  -0.43 *  -0.38 (*) 
Obs.  14291 14024 14024 14024 10209 
Groups  1495 1464 1464 1464 1233 
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%, (*) near 10%   
Notes: i) all variables in log; ii) with year dummies 1985-2002; and iii) in column (3) the interaction 
between the RIA dummy variable and the log of the respective extended market of the RIA to 
which host country belongs; iv) Res. CENIT from López and Orlicki (2005). 
 
 
Columns (2) to (4) show similar results to those given by López and Orlicki (column 1) for 
the estimation of coefficients of the control variables that are normally included in gravity 
models, GDP of source countries (GDP Source) and of host countries (GDP Host), 
notwithstanding the inclusion of two new variables: Simisize and XMH. GDP Host does not 
show a significant coefficient, even though internal market size and dynamic are the 
principal variables to which most empirical studies about determinants of FDI refer. This 
would be indicating that the horizontal FDI assumed to prevail in the world since the end of 
                                                 
18 We made estimations including proxies for human capital endowments like an approximation to include 
differences in factorial endowments as determinants of bilateral FDI. From 1990, information about the labor 
force in tertiary education for countries in the sample is only partially available, so the number of observations 
is considerably reduced. This variable was not significant, and it modifies the significance of other parameters 
that in most estimations were robust.   18




Some of the other variables included in general model yielded results that sustain the 
conclusion above.  While Simisize, an index of similarity in size between source and host 
countries, has a non significant coefficient, XMH, which is designed to capture the effect of 
openness, has the expected sign although with a low level of significance. These results 
could be understood as weak evidence of greater influence of vertical FDI in the world 
average. 
 
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have a positive and statistically significant effect on 
bilateral FDI flows. This is a robust result that appears consistently in different 
specifications of the model
20.  
 
The other model variables retain their significance and show small changes in magnitude, 
with the exception of IntraEU, the variable designed to measure the effect of internal 
creation of FDI in EU countries, which is less significant than in the López and Orlicki 
results. This is explained by the inclusion of the openness variable (XMH). If XMH is 
eliminated from the estimation, the IntraEU coefficient is significant and high
21. 
  
This result is interesting when it comes to prospective reflection about the potential 
impacts of integration agreements that the MERCOSUR could make with northern 
countries. It is well known that intra-European trade accounts for the biggest average 
share of total European trade, therefore intra-European trade should be one of the main 
factors in the XMH of those countries. It does not seem that the existence of the European 
Community / European Union in itself is what fosters FDI flows between these countries. It 
seems that what determines bilateral FDI flows is an increase in commercial flows as a 
product of the agreement or of other factors. 
 
In column (5) the same specification is considered for 1984-1997. The aim here is to 
isolate the results obtained from the extraordinary FDI growth that took place at the end of 
the 1990s, which was linked to M&A and took place mostly in developed countries. We 
consider that this model specification cannot explain the reasons for this process
22.  
 
The results for the model variables in this “normal” sub period are generally similar to 
those obtained for the complete period, although there are some variations in levels. In 
particular, the elasticity of bilateral FDI flows as regards host country external trade is 
                                                 
19 The results obtained have extremely small R
2 coefficients. F proofs support a significance level upper of 
99%. These results rely on the inclusion of negative bilateral FDI flows. In order to try to explain why host 
country GDP is not significant, estimations were made using only positive bilateral FDI flows. In this case, the 
significance level of the model increase and GDP Host is significant. Estimations and a more detailed 
interpretation of the results are given in Annex 1. 
20 In contrast to this result, the World Bank (2003) says that “countries that had concluded a BIT were no more 
likely to receive additional FDI than were countries without such a pact”. UNCTAD (1998) specifies that “with 
respect to its impacts on FDI, results of an aggregate statistical analysis do not reveal an independent 
significant impact of BITs on FDI flow determination”. It is important to notice that BITs are not made between 
developed countries, which are the main countries in bilateral FDI flows. 
21 This comparison is valid for the estimation with the IntraEU dummy variable and with variables that interact 
between the IntraEU dummy and EU GDP.  
22 Estimations geared to studying the impact of M&A on FDI bilateral flows were carried out. In these 
estimations variables to measure this phenomenon (amounts bought and amounts sold, and dummies to 
differentiate the principal buyer and seller countries) were included. The estimations were not able to capture 
this phenomenon very well since the new variables were not significant.   19
significant and has a higher value than in 1984-2002
23. In this period, the IntraEU variable 
is not significant, and this could support the hypothesis that trade flows determine FDI 
flows among EU countries. 
 
The results obtained when the openness variable (XMH) is replaced by total exports for 
total flows and for flows between developed countries and from developed to developing 




Results of the Baseline with Simisize, XH and X by group of countries, 1984-2002 
 
Total  Between Developed Countries  From Developed Countries in 
Developing Countries 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) (9) 
GDP Host  -1.46 -0.98 -2.17 -4.89 -4.71 -4.15  -2.31  -1.38 -3.91 
GDP Source  5.41 ***  5.70 ***  5.60 ***  20.7 ***  20.7 ***  20.7 ***  7.63 (*)  7.88 (*)  8.16 * 
Simisize  1.61 1.31 1.60 4.35 4.45 4.66  1.12  0.26 1.88 
Prrh  5.11 ***  5.04 ***  5.24 ***  3.07  2.98  3.02  3.11 *  3.11 *  3.12 * 
Inflation  -0.99 ***  -0.99 ***  -0.98 ***  1.62  1.67  1.61  -0.81 **  -0.75 **  -0.82 ** 
Priv  0.04 **  0.04 **  0.04 **  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.05 *  0.06 *  0.05 (*) 
BIT  1.26 **  1.31 **  1.27 **  4.46  4.59  4.54  1.31 *  1.54 *  1.52 ** 
XMH  0.28      -0.13  ---  --- 0.55  * ---  --- 
XH    -0.33 ---  --- -0.15 --- ---  0.01 --- 
X-developed    --- 1.45  *** ---  ---  -0.34 ---  --- 2.79  *** 
X-developing    --- -0.24 ---  --- -0.27  --- --- -0.43 
IntraRIA1  2.91 **  2.94 **  3.07 **  0.75  0.75  0.75  1.32  1.91  -0.1 
IntraEU  1.74 (*)  2.24 **  1.63 (*)  1.32  1.30  1.36  Drop  Drop  Drop 
Intraothers  2.88 *  3.25 **  2.73 *  2.15  2.13  2.13  Drop  Drop  Drop 
ExtraRIA1  1.78 ***  1.83 ***  1.82 ***  -0.58  -0.59  -0.58  0.45  0.68  0.80 
ExtraEU  3.36 ***  3.77 ***  3.22 **  2.68  2.64  2.68  Drop  Drop  Drop 
Extraothers  0.71 1.14  * 0.69 -0.31 -0.27 -0.34  0.27  0.72 -0.02 
Expmars  -0.43 *  -0.43 *  -0.41 *  -0.27  -0.27  -0.27  -0.63 *  -0.63 (*)  -0.52 (*) 
Obs.  14024  14274  14187  5556 5556 5556  5668  5888 5802 
Groups  1464  1495  1495  411 411 411  617  639 639 
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%, (*) near 10%   
Notes: i) all variables in log; ii) with year dummies 1985-2002; iii) all columns with RIA dummy; and iv) in columns (4 to 6), 
BIT is 1 only in Germany-Portugal in 1984-85 and France-Israel in 1985-02. BITs, in general, are not made between 
developed countries.  
  
The increase in total exports from host countries (XH) is not significant as an explanatory 
variable for received FDI flows in the total sample. But when exports are divided by 
destination country, those to developed countries have a positive and significant effect 
while those to developing countries are not significant (columns 2 and 3). 
 
When bilateral investment flows among developed countries are analyzed, elasticity as 
regards source country GDP is the only variable that is significant in the explanation of 
                                                 
23 A  Chow test of structural change parameters was carried out. The results refute the null hypothesis that 
parameters are constant.   20




When we analyze FDI from developed to developing countries, the coefficient associated 
with policy risk, inflation, BITs, privatizations, openness and source country GDP are 
significant (with different levels of significance and different values in different model 
specifications) . These results could suggest the existence of vertical or some other type of 
FDI. Estimated parameters for economic integration variables, in general, are not 
significant; with the exception of deviation effect (the Expmars coefficient is significant and 
negative). 
  
The IntraRIA1 variable was unable to capture the effects on FDI connected to regional 
agreements between the Latin American countries. It was only able to capture the 
increase in FDI flows from the USA and Canada to Mexico. On average, the impact of the 
NAFTA would not be significant. 
 
On average, agreements between developing countries do not appear to have a positive 
impact on investment from developed countries, as can be seen from the significance of 
the coefficients of ExtraRIA1 and Extraothers. Only trade dynamics, independently of 
agreements, seems to have impacted on FDI. 
 
When we differentiate by export destination (column 9), exports to developed countries are 
positive and significant. This could indicate the predominance of resource-seeking FDI or 
the presence of the logic of an “export platform” associated with non horizontal forms of 
FDI. 
 
The estimations of the baseline considering exports from host countries differentiated by 
type of goods – commodities and manufactures - are presented in table 3, and they seem 
to reinforce the above result. Exports of commodities or of goods more intensive in natural 
resources (X-food) are positive and significant, while exports of manufactured goods or 
with higher technological content (X-manuftotal) are not significant (column 1). 
 
This result is similar in the case of FDI from developed countries in developing countries 
(column 4), where exports of manufactures are significant and negative. None of these 
variables are significant in the case of FDI between developed countries (column 3). 
 
Finally, in estimations carried out with exports disaggregated  by type of manufactured 
goods (X-textil, X-chemical, X-machequip) (column 2) included in the model, host country 
exports in goods intensive in labor (X-textil) are significant and positive in explaining total 
bilateral FDI flow increases. Exports of other goods with greater technological content or 
with greater added value (such as X-chemical and X-machequip) show a significant and 
negative relation
25. This result is similar to the case of FDI from developed countries in 
developing countries (column 5)
26. 
 
                                                 
24  Neither total exports from developed countries nor exports by destination are significant in this model. The 
integration agreements have not significant effects on FDI.  These results could mean that this model 
specification is not appropriate to explain bilateral FDI between developed countries.  
25 This model specification reduces the number of observation and some explanatory variables lose 
significance (GDPs, BIT and all integration variables). 
26 In the case of FDI between developed countries, not one of these variables was significant, confirming the 
result given above.   21
Table 3 
Results of the Baseline with Simisize and X by group of countries 
and type of goods, 1984-2002 
 




  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) 
GDP Host  -0.32 0.08  -4.89 0.44  1.53 
GDP Source  5.66 ***  3.77 (*)  20.7 ***  6.98 (*)  1.2 
Simisize  1.98 2.49  4.35 1.22 5.87  (*) 
Prrh  5.17 ***  4.71 ***  3.07  3.82 **  4.67 ** 
Inflation  -1.01 ***  -1.62 ***  1.62  -0.77 **  -1.28 *** 
Priv  0.04 **  0.03*  0.02  0.05 (*)  0.04 
BIT  0.94 (*)  0.73  4.46  1.17 *  1.19 (*) 
X-food   0.87 (*)  0.54  ---  1.42 *  0.94 
X-mining   -0.1 0.09  ---  -0.48 -0.33 
X-manuftotal  -0.42 ---  ---  -1.07  (*) --- 
X-chemicals  ---  -1.04 (*)  ---  ---  -1.04  
X-machequip  ---  -0.63 *  ---  ---  -0.99 ** 
X-textil  ---  1.98  *** ---  --- 2.33  *** 
IntraRIA1  3.22  **  -0.52 0.75  2.37 -0.83 
IntraEU  1.99 *  0.20  1.32  Drop  Drop 
Intraothers  3.18 **  0.56  2.15  Drop  Drop 
ExtraRIA1  2.02 ***  0.80  -0.58  1.51 *  1.67 (*) 
ExtraEU  3.55 ***  0.53  2.68  Drop  Drop 
Extraothers  1.01 (*)  -0.67  -0.31  0.97  -0.64 
Expmars  -0.39  (*)  -0.17 -0.27  -0.51 -0.17 
Obs.  13910 10742  5556  5559  4560 
Groups  1486 1483  411  635  633 
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%, (*) near 10%   
Notes: i) all variables in log; ii) with year dummies 1985-2002; iii) all columns with RIA 
dummy; and iv) X-chemicals and X-machequip: 1990-2002.  
 
 
Previous results suggest that open expansion forms with resource seeking strategies 
(natural resources and cheap labor) account for most bilateral FDI from developed to 
developing countries. This FDI is related to TNC strategies involving greater integration, 




4.2 Winners and Losers 
 
The results of the model for analyzing winners and losers are presented in table 4. The 
model was estimated with fixed effects by bilateral relationship (columns 1, 3 and 5) and 
with country dummies (columns 2, 4 and 6) including other variables usually used in 
gravity models. In the fixed effect columns, country effects were contrasted with two 
general variables, IntraRia1 and ExtraRia1.  
 
Taking into account the first group of variables (dummies) the MERCOSUR seems to have 
created significant intra-bloc FDI flows, even though the available information is poor and 
does not allow us to identify FDI flows to Argentina and Uruguay from other MERCOSUR 
countries. Brazil seems to have captured internal FDI flows. 
   22
Table 4 
Results by MERCOSUR countries: Winners and Losers  
 
 MERCOSUR  countries 
with dummies  MERCOSUR countries with relative size 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP Host  -1.23  -1.63 -1.21 -1.62 -1.20 -1.61 
GDP Source  5.28 ***  6.04 ***  5.28 ***  6.04 ***  5.27 ***  6.05 *** 
Simisize  1.18  0.63 ***  1.19  0.63 ***  1.19  0.63 *** 
Prrh  5.35 ***  5.36 ***  5.35 ***  5.36 ***  5.40 ***  5.42 *** 
Inflation  -1.05 ***  -0.98 ***  -1.05 ***  -0.98 ***  -1.05 ***  -0.98 *** 
Priv  0.04 **  0.03 *  0.04 **  0.03 *  0.04 **  0.03 * 
BIT  1.51 ***  0.82 **  1.50 ***  0.82 **  1.52 ***  0.82 ** 
XMh  0.42 *  0.38 *  0.42 *  0.38 *  0.42 *  0.38 * 
IntraRIA1  1.97  1.63 *  1.96  1.62 *  0.07  0.06 * 
IntraEU  1.72 (*)  0.99  1.72 (*)  0.99  0.05 (*)  0.03 
Intraothers  2.72 *  1.98 *  2.72 *  1.98 *  0.10 (*)  0.07 * 
ExtraRIA1  1.63 ***  1.80 ***  1.63 ***  1.79 ***  0.06 ***  0.06 *** 
ExtraEU  3.25 **  1.25  3.25 **  1.25  0.11 **  0.04 
Extraothers  0.64  0.42 0.64 0.42 0.02 0.01 
Dargintra/Argintra  Drop  Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop 
Dbraintra/Braintra  7.74 *  7.63 ***  1.82 *  1.79 ***  1.85 *  1.81 *** 
Dparintra/Parintra  -0.15  -0.58 -0.09 -0.55 -0.07 -0.59 
Duruintra/Uruintra  Drop  Drop Drop Drop Drop Drop 
Dargextra/Argextra  -3.99 **  -3.80 **  -1.13 *  -1.07 **  -1.13 *  -1.07 ** 
Dbraextra/Braextra  3.34 **  1.88  0.79 **  0.45  0.80 **  0.47 (*) 
Dparextra/Parextra  -3.92  -3.66  ***  -5.72 -5.38 -5.72  -5.37  ** 
Duruextra/Uruextra  3.59  4.15  (*)  3.14 3.66 3.14 3.67 
Distance  ---  -2.01  *** --- -2.01  *** --- -2.01  *** 
Language  ---  1.92  *** --- 1.92  *** --- 1.92  *** 
Contiguity  ---  0.81  * --- 0.81  * --- 0.81  * 
Expmars  -0.47 *  -0.48 **  -0.47 *  -0.48 **  -0.47 *  -0.48 ** 
Obs.  14024  14024 14024 14024 14024 14024 
Groups  1464  --- 1464 --- 1464 --- 
 
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%, (*) near 10%   
Note: i) With bilateral fixed effects: columns 1, 3 and 5; ii) without bilateral fixed effects and with dummies by country 
and other variables (language, distance and contiguity): columns 2, 4 and 6; iii) RIA-dummy: columns 1 to 4; iv) the 
interaction between the RIA dummy variables and the log of the respective extended market of the RIA to which the 
host country belongs: columns 5 and 6. 
 
 
As regards external FDI creation, the MERCOSUR countries differ in their behavior as 
host countries. Brazil would be the “winner” inside the bloc and Argentina would clearly be 
the “loser”. This differentiated behavior indicates that, during the period, while FDI flows in 
Brazil increased ahead of Brazilian economic and policy determinants and go beyond the 
general effect of ExtraRIA1,  FDI flows to Argentina tended to decrease since the 
Dargextra  coefficient is negative and greater than ExtraRIA1. In this period, investors 
reduced their FDI flows to Argentina, and these were below Argentina’s growth potential. 
In the estimation without fixed effects the results are a little different: Uruguay emerges as 
the single possible winner, while Argentina and Paraguay would receive flows from extra-
bloc sources that are below their capability
27. 
                                                 
27 In this estimation, when we consider the cross section model, that is when we emphasize why investors 
select one country or another country and not FDI evolution over time, the Simesize variable is significant. This   23
 
Estimations with the second group of variables (relative size) yield results that are similar, 
but lower as regards internal and external FDI creation. This would suggest a better fit 
than the estimation with the first group of variables. 
 
External creation of FDI flows would be concentrated in Brazil (a significant and positive 
variable) and would be reduced in Argentina (a significant and negative variable). These 
results indicate that as Brazil grew relatively in the MERCOSUR-RIA (especially in 1998-
2002); increased FDI inflows into the country were significant, while the relative fall in 
Argentina’s share is linked to less FDI than Brazil received
28. 
 
Estimations from the basic model were made including exports from the region and from 
the four MERCOSUR countries, and also including export destination (developed and 
developing countries). The objective of these estimations was to find some factors that 
would allow us to identify which types of FDI are leading regional inflows, and to link this 
FDI typology to potential winners and losers in an intensified integration process. 
 
The results presented in table A-3 in the annex suggest that the increase in MERCOSUR 
exports to developed countries is a significant explanatory factor in the growth of FDI 
flows. The opposite happens with exports to developing countries. These results might 
indicate that investment in MERCOSUR is to a certain extent integrated into trade flows 
and FDI. Hence, if integration agreements are made between the MERCOSUR and 
NAFTA, and between the MERCOSUR and the EU, the region could receive increased 
FDI inflows linked to trade flows. The MERCOSUR countries do not all behave in the same 
way. These considerations about the MERCOSUR as a whole apply to Brazil, but in 
Argentina trade flows seem to have less of an effect on FDI inflows. This is explained by 
the greater influence exerted by the internal market and the privatization of public services 
as determinant factors in the FDI Argentina received in this period. In Paraguay and 
Uruguay trade flows were not significant. 
 
These results tend to show that Brazil and Argentina would be winners, but with the 
differences noted above in their behavior. FDI in Brazil appears more connected to 
positive trade flows to source countries. The role of trade openness as a factor 
determining FDI was identified and analyzed in Bittencourt and Domingo (2002). A similar 
result was obtained with a different econometric approach: exports and trade openness to 
countries outside the region are determinant factors in FDI inflows
29. 
                                                                                                                                                     
shows that internal market size is important in investors’ decisions, while MERCOSUR is not an important 
determinant in extra-bloc investors’ decisions to invest in Brazil. However, as is shown in the fixed effect 
model, the MERCOSUR could have contributed to determining the evolution over time of Brazil’s FDI inflows. 
The perception of Uruguay as a possible “winner” differs from the results obtained in previous studies. 
28 In this case, estimations without fixed effects are similar to those we have already mentioned.  The 
MERCOSUR would determine FDI movement more than the option of Brazil as an FDI destination. With all 
other variables equal, FDI in Brazil grows more than in the other MERCOSUR countries. It is known that in the 
second half of the 1990s (Laplane et al., 2002) Brazil received big FDI inflows through M&A, particularly in 
public services privatizations. Perhaps our Priv variable is not enough to capture the extent of this 
phenomenon, which is contemporary with the MERCOSUR dummy, so this factor could be a partial influence 
on this last variable. 
29 This result seems more or less to contradict the predominance of “market seeking” FDI identified in other 
studies, and there are two possible reasons for this. First, we have already mentioned that when we analyze 
the model with fixed effects in each bilateral relationship we are emphasizing the estimation “with in” (the 
movement of each relationship), more than the capacity to capture the level or absolute amount. Second, there 
might be an endogeneity problem between exports and GDP, a key aspect of our previous study but one which 
seems not to be important in this study as, in general, host country GDP is not significant.    24
 
  5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
A first interesting point that emerges from the analysis is that host country GDP does not 
have a significant coefficient, and internal market size and dynamics are the most 
significant variables in FDI determinant studies. This indicates a change in FDI forms from 
horizontal to vertical and/or complex. The form that FDI among countries takes allows us 
to profile winners and losers as regards FDI flows in the framework of regional integration 
agreements. 
 
Another result that reinforces the above is that there is a positive relationship between FDI 
flows and trade openness (XMH). The variable which measures the internal FDI creation 
effect for EU countries (IntraEU) loses significance when we include the XMH variable in 
the model, because the principal market for EU exports is the EU itself. Intra-European 
trade operates as a determinant of trade openness, and this has a positive effect on FDI 
flows. This result indicates that one of the main determinants of FDI flows is increased 
trade flows (as a consequence of an integration agreement or because of other factors). 
When we evaluate possible agreements to expand MERCOSUR integration, this behavior 
must be taken into account. If this increase means increased trade flows, the countries 
could have associated increased FDI flows. But an agreement is not in itself sufficient to 
increase FDI inflows, there would have to be a previous or simultaneous change in the 
MERCOSUR countries’ main international insertion strategy. 
 
When we reduce the period of analysis to remove distortions generated by the mergers 
and acquisitions that took place in the 1990s, the results show that FDI increases could be 
associated to external creation of FDI in countries that could join the FTAA and also in the 
EU. At the same time there is greater elasticity in bilateral FDI flows related to foreign 
trade. 
 
Horizontal FDI (oriented to the internal market) would predominate in bilateral flows among 
developed countries; elasticity associated to the GDP of the source country is the only 
significant variable in explaining the movement of FDI flows. In FDI flows between 
developed and developing countries, other variables besides the GDP of the source 
country are significant: trade openness, political risk, privatizations, inflation, and bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs), so these results indicate that horizontal forms of transnational 
expansion are not the principal determinants of bilateral FDI movements. 
 
The above hypothesis is supported by the results obtained when we differentiate host 
country exports by type of good. In the case of FDI among developed countries, no export 
variables were significant. In FDI from developed to developing countries, the results show 
that open expansion forms of the “resource seeking” type (natural resources and labor) are 
the main factor in explaining the pattern of FDI movement. This means that TNCs have 
developed strategies of greater integration which have been most important since the last 
decade of the 20th century. In this case the variation in total X is positive and significant, 
and so are exports of primary goods or of those more intensive in natural resources, but 
exports of industrial goods or of those with greater technological content seem to impact 
negatively and significantly on the increase in bilateral FDI flows. It may be that complex 
international forms of integration are progressing more slowly than was foreseen in other 
studies, or that these are not the best variables to capture this impact. 
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Previous results could indicate that if FTAA and MERCOSUR-EU agreements lead to an 
increase in trade flows –as can be expected- and these flows have a positive impact on 
FDI flows, then the predominant forms of expansion would be open/resource seeking 
forms, since these agreements involve relationships between developed and developing 
countries. 
 
In the analysis of which countries would be winners or losers as attractors of FDI in the 
framework of MERCOSUR, the estimation results (using a special methodological 
approach – the inclusion of specific attraction variables) show that different countries 
behave differently. Brazil would be the only “winner” inside the bloc and Argentina would 
probably be the “loser” as regards the external creation of FDI. With the rest of the 
variables in the model, particularly the ExtraRIA1 effect, being equal, FDI flows in Brazil 
would increase over general determinants during the period, and foreign investment in 
Argentina would tend to decrease with respect to the country’s potential.  
 
The results for the small economies, on the other hand, are not so significant. They show 
that Uruguay is near to being a “winner” and Paraguay a “loser”, both in relation to that 
country’s potential as defined by changes in other variables. 
 
A significant factor in the increase in FDI flows into the MERCOSUR countries has been 
the growth in exports from the bloc to developed countries. This indicates that investment 
in the region is correlated to a certain extent with trade flows from the MERCOSUR 
countries. If integration agreements with the EU and with the NAFTA materialize, the 
MERCOSUR will receive increasing FDI flows associated with the additional trade flows 
that these agreements would generate. These considerations for the whole of the 
MERCOSUR also apply to Brazil, but in Argentina the main determinants of FDI would be 
the internal market and the privatization of public services (trade flows seem to have a 
decreasing effect on FDI flows). The above results show that Brazil would be a “winner” 
and Argentina a “loser” (trade flows are not significant in FDI in Paraguay and Uruguay). 
 
The results of the winners and losers analysis are not sufficiently robust to allow us to 
project the potential impacts of FTAA or EU agreements on FDI flows to the MERCOSUR 
countries, when we start from variables that represent existing integration agreements 
using dummies or the “extended market”. The gravitational model does not suitably 
capture phenomena or FDI forms that had great weight during the period analyzed. But it 
is very difficult to include control variables in these models since there are no countries 
comparable to those of the MERCOSUR that have previous experience in enlarged 
agreements with the EU or the NAFTA. 
 
On the contrary, identifying the forms of FDI that predominate in some bilateral 
relationships seems to offer a better option for making projections as to the effects of 
agreements with the northern countries. In particular, it would be possible to establish a 
link between potential trade flow increases and the FDI that the MERCOSUR countries 
would receive, if we link the agreements to a change in the form of FDI that is currently 
dominant in the MERCOSUR, from horizontal to vertical or complex (the latter associated 
with trade flows, from the perspective of developing countries). The results support the 
hypothesis that trade flow growth is the determinant factor in a great part of intra-European 
FDI (and probably of the FDI received by Mexico when this country joined the NAFTA), 
and matters more than making an integration agreement. In other words, if the integration 
agreement does not generate new trade flows (before, at the same time as, or as a   26
consequence of FDI received), there will probably not be a significant increase in FDI 
flows. 
 
How would this structure of winners and losers change if the FTAA and the MERCOSUR-
EU agreements materialize and come into force? Which countries in the integration 
agreements would be better able to make a change to export strategies? 
 
We can only offer tentative answers to these questions or express concern about possible 
scenarios for the future. One possibility is that the FTAA and EU agreements may 
accentuate existing differences in external capture of FDI, and Brazil and Uruguay would 
tend to consolidate their winning positions while Argentina and Paraguay would be losers. 
 
Brazil has a higher level of industrial development and is supported by the development of  
internal scale economies, so there is greater potential for TNC affiliates to change from 
“market seeking” strategies to strong exports strategies, supported by exports to other 
developing countries and some specialized exports to developed countries. 
 
Uruguay’s potential has to do with its geographical location as an entry and exit point for 
the MERCOSUR, and also with its well-developed natural resources, and the country 
could move towards vertical or complex strategies. The principal problem could be to 
induce entry TNCs to produce goods with greater value added in the framework of their 
vertical strategies, which are dominant in this country. This could avoid or compensate for 
the tendency of FDI to generate “enclaves” geared to natural resources.  
 
Argentina seems to be in an intermediate situation. There is potential for a change to 
export strategies that go beyond natural resources, and this seems to depend increasingly 
on the possibility of obtaining scale economies inside the MERCOSUR. Today this 
situation seems to be very complicated. 
 
The central problem for Argentina and Uruguay is that they have very low average long 
term growth rates closely linked to volatility in the two economies (Bittencourt, 2003c). 
Their economies are very interconnected and greater integration into the MERCOSUR, 
principally with Brazil, is a key factor in the possibility for industrial development 
(Bittencourt, 2003b). 
 
Paraguay is by far the most worrying case, with its intra-territoriality, high poverty levels, 
late economic evolution and high levels of informality in the economy. All this means 
Paraguay has less potential than its partners to capture FDI.    
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ANNEX 1: Estimations with Positive FDI 
 
Here we give the estimation results using only positive bilateral FDI flows (table A-1). 
Between 1998 and 2001, there were big negative bilateral FDI flows, principally among 
developed countries and specifically among European countries. This phenomenon is a 
reflection of the wave of mergers and acquisitions among major TNCs that took place in 
the period. To reduce the weight of this transitory phenomenon we estimated the model 
only with positive FDI flows
30.  
 
This exercise is intended to explain why host GDP is not significant in the model. If a 
model with positive FDI flows were valid it would mean that the specification we are using 
is suitable for capturing the reasons why investors increase their flows to countries where 
they are already installed (FDI reinvestment), but it is not so appropriate when it comes to 
explaining the decision to select one particular country for bilateral FDI (null option), or to 




Results of the Baseline with Simisize and XMh 1984-2002 
(positive bilateral FDI) 
 Total 








GDP Host  0.15  0.35 **  1.23 ***  0.51 * 
GDP Source  1.44 ***  1.42 ***  2.04 ***  1.54 ** 
Simisize  0.41 *  ---  0.59  -1.11 *** 
Prrh  0.67 ***  0.67 ***  0.57 (*)  0.98 *** 
Inflation  -0.36 ***  -0.36 ***  1.01 ***  -0.24 *** 
Priv  0.01** 0.01**  0.01 0.01  *** 
BIT  0.42 ***  0.41 ***  0.05  0.25 *** 
XMh  0.02  0.02  -0.73 ***  0.06 (*) 
IntraRIA1  0.61 ***  0.61 ***  -0.94 **  -0.15 
IntraEU  0.54 ***  0.54 ***  0.29  Drop 
Intraothers  0.43 **  0.43 **  -0.13  Drop 
ExtraRIA1  -0.06 -0.06  -0.67  ***  0.06 
ExtraEU  0.67 ***  0.67 ***  0.28  Drop 
Extraothers  0.15 *  0.15 *  -0.33  0.1 
Expmars  0.08 **  0.07 **  0.01  0.05 
Obs.  10778 10778  4449  4370 
Groups  1377 1377  401  593 
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%, (*) near 10%   
Notes: i) all variables in log; ii) with year dummies 1985-2002; iii) the interaction between the RIA 
dummy variables and the log of the respective extended market of the RIA to which the host 
country belongs; and iv) ) in column of developed countries, BIT is 1 only in Germany-Portugal in 
1984-85 and France-Israel in 1985-02. In general, developed countries do not enter into BITs with 
each other.  
                                                 
30 We eliminated 3,246 observations: 1,593 negatives and 1,653 nulls. This yielded improved model 
explanatory capacity.   30
 
 
In this model (with positive flows) a difference from the previous formulation is that 
reinvestment decisions are explained basically by factors associated with the home market 
and the host’s internal market. The Simesize variable (column 1) and source country GDP 
are significant, but if we eliminate the first variable (column 2) it is the only situation where 
elasticity related to host country GDP is significant and with the expected sign (although 
with a lower value than source country GDP). In neither of these cases is openness 
significant. This would support the idea that horizontal FDI is dominant in “reinvestment” 
decisions. 
 
Almost all coefficients that associate integration processes with FDI flows are significant 
but with less magnitude that those obtained in estimations with total flows. This means 
more limited potential increases (probably more “rational”) and it is congruent with the fact 
that FDI increase perspectives in integration processes are not important when expansion 
forms are “market seeking”. In this case, in general, integration processes mainly 
determine investment restructuring. 
 
In positive FDI flows among developed countries, the dynamics of the source market and 
of the host markets are the main explanation of these flows, while openness is significant 
and has a negative sign. This confirms previous results about a possible predominance of 
horizontal FDI among developed countries. 
 
In FDI flows from developed to developing countries, variables that explain integration 
processes are not significant. 
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ANNEX 2: Winners & Losers; Third Group of Specific Attraction Variables 
 
To explore an alternative methodology that helps to capture or to identify winners and 
losers in RIAs more clearly, we carried out an exercise estimating the model including 
variables geared to measuring the FDI attraction of each country considering a set of 
country-specific characteristics. We constructed internal and external FDI attraction 
variables for each country. Market size (GDP Host) increased the size effect (GDP 
H+RIA), privatizations (Priv) and openness of trade flows (XMH) are considered as 
positive determinants, while inflation (Inflation) and political risk (Prrh) are considered as 
negative determinants
31. The results obtained with these variables (table A-2) were similar 
but lower than those obtained with the other two groups of variables (table 4). 
 
Table A-2 
Results by MERCOSUR countries: 
  Winners and Losers  
 (1)  (2) 
GDP Host  -1.20 -1.61 
GDP Source  5.23 ***  6.01 *** 
Simisize  1.20 0.64  *** 
Prrh  5.29 ***  5.30 *** 
Inflation  -1.07 ***  -0.99 *** 
Priv  0.04 **  0.03 * 
BIT  1.55 ***  0.82 ** 
XMh  0.40 *  0.37 * 
IntraRIA1  1.95 1.94  ** 
IntraEU  1.74 (*)  1.01 
Intraothers  2.74 *  1.99 * 
ExtraRIA1  1.63 ***  1.81 *** 
ExtraEU  3.26 **  1.27 
Extraothers  0.65 0.43 
A-Argintra  Drop Drop 
A-Braintra  0.27 *  0.25 *** 
A-Parintra  0.04 0.11 
A-Uruintra  Drop Drop 
A-Argextra  -0.15 **  -0.14 ** 
A-Braextra  0.12 **  0.07 
A-Parextra  0.02 0.03 
A-Uruextra  0.32 0.29  *** 
Distance  --- -2.01  *** 
Language  --- 1.92  *** 
Contiguity  --- 0.83  * 
Expmars  -0.47 *  -0.48 ** 
Obs.  14024 14024 
Groups  1464 --- 
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%, (*) near 10%   
Note: i) all variables in log; ii) column (1) with RIA-dummies; and iii) 
column (2) without bilateral fixed effects and with dummies by country 
and other variables (language, distance and contiguity). 
 
                                                 
31  Variables were constructed as the interaction among dummies of each country’s internal and external 
attraction, and variables that represent positive and negative determinants. Four variables for internal creation 
(A-Argintra, A-Braintra, A-Parintra, and A-Uruintra) and four for external creation (A-Argextra, A-Braextra, A-
Parextra, and A-Uruextra) were generated.   32
 




Results by MERCOSUR countries with X by groups of countries 
1984-2002 
  Total MERCOSUR  MERCOSUR’s countries 
  Total X  X by group of 
countries  Total X  X by group of 
countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP Host  -1.35 -1.11 -1.26 -1.18 
GDP Source  5.47 ***  5.29 ***  5.36 ***  5.35 *** 
Simisize  1.37 1.34 1.16 1.31 
Prrh  5.13 ***  5.04 ***  5.30 ***  5.24 *** 
Inflation  -0.94 ***  -1.01 ***  -1.01 ***  -1.01 *** 
Priv  0.04 **  0.03 *  0.04 **  0.04 ** 
BIT  1.21 **  1.46 **  1.49 **  1.42 ** 
XMh  0.31  0.37 (*)  0.39 *  0.41 * 
MercoXtotal  0.05  --- --- --- 
MercoXdesa   --- 4.63  *** ---  --- 
MercoXendesa  --- -4.56  *** ---  --- 
ArgXtotal   ---  --- -0.17  ** --- 
BraXtotal   ---  --- 0.13  ** --- 
ParXtotal  --- ---  -0.19  --- 
UruXtotal  --- ---  0.16  --- 
ArgXdesa   --- --- ---  -0.18  ** 
BraXdesa  --- --- ---  0.14  ** 
ParXdesa  --- --- ---  -0.19 
UruXdesa  --- --- ---  0.17 
IntraRIA1  2.66 *  2.62 *  2.90 **  2.93 * 
IntraEU  1.73 (*)  1.71 (*)  1.72 (*)  1.79 (*) 
Intraothers  2.89 *  2.83 *  2.75 *  2.79 * 
ExtraRIA1  1.55 ***  1.57 ***  1.63 ***  1.65 *** 
ExtraEU  3.37 ***  3.34 ***  3.27 ***  3.35 *** 
Extraothers  0.71 0.66 0.65 0.68 
Expmars  -0.42 *  -0.42 *  -0.45 *  -0.42 * 
Obs.  14007 13920 14007 13921 
Groups  1464 1464 1464 1464 
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%, (*) near 10%   
Note: i) all variables in log; ii) with RIA-dummies; and iii) the new variables were constructed as the 
interaction between trade variables and country dummies (Example: ArgXtotal = Xtotal * Dargextra)   33
ANNEX 4: List of Countries in the Database 
 
OECD Outflows Database: 
Host Countries: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, 
the United States, Venezuela, Australia, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Czech Republic, 
China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom. 
Source Countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South 




Countries added to the database on the basis of UNCTAD and ECLAC information on FDI 
inflows 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bahamas, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, the United 
States, Venezuela. 
 